Russian nationalists on the Kremlin’s policy in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 156|24.12.2014 by Jarzyńska, Katarzyna
1OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 156
www.osw.waw.plCentre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 156 | 24.12.2014
Russian nationalists on the Kremlin’s policy in Ukraine
Katarzyna Jarzyńska
On the Day of National Unity, celebrated in Russia every 4 November, members of nationalist move-
ments organise a so-called Russian March in Moscow. In 2014 the nationalists took part in three 
competing marches, which illustrated the divisions present in these circles. The reason for these di-
visions is a difference of opinions on the policy pursued by Russia towards Ukraine. The pro-Russian, 
Russia-inspired protests in south-eastern Ukraine organised under the slogan of ‘defending’ the 
Russians living there (the ‘Russian Spring’) and the annexation of Crimea were received enthusi-
astically by the nationalists and contributed to a consolidation of these circles around the Kremlin 
which lasted for several months. In spite of this, opinions on the Russian government’s current policy 
towards the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics have been varied. The most radi-
cal groups have demanded that military support be offered, and that the ‘confederation’ of these 
republics, the so-called ‘Novorossiya’, should be officially recognised. They consider the Kremlin’s 
policy to have been too soft, and see the signing of the peace agreements in Minsk as a betrayal of 
the interests of the Russians. For the remaining representatives of nationalist circles, who are not so 
numerous and are less visible in the public sphere, finding a solution for Russia’s domestic problems 
remains a priority. Some of them oppose the very notion of Russia’s involvement in the conflict.
Since the beginning of the ‘Russian Spring’, the Kremlin has fostered active attitudes among the na-
tionalists and solicited their support, hoping to win a valuable ally. This has boosted hopes in these 
circles that their political position may be strengthened. The involvement in the fighting in Ukraine 
has led to a radicalisation of attitudes among the nationalists, and demonstrated that this group 
is ideologically motivated and has considerable potential for mobilisation. Moreover, the ‘Great 
Russian’ and anti-Western slogans some of them have propagated are reflected in views displayed 
by average Russians, who have been influenced by the patriotic enthusiasm which followed the 
annexation of Crimea. Due to all this, from among all the actors active on the opposition side, it is 
the nationalists – and not the representatives of the liberal and pro-Western opposition – that have 
the best prospects for access to the political stage in Russia. It cannot be ruled out that a further 
strengthening of the radical groups might also be boosted by the possible growing social frustra-
tion caused by the economic crisis, which additionally increases the risk of political destabilisation. 
Two lines of nationalism in Russia
The nationalist circle in Russia is fragmented, and 
non-homogenous in the ideological sense. It is 
formed by groups characterised by various organ-
isational structures (movements, non-registered 
parties, organisations operating in the virtual world) 
and profiles (patriotic-social, religious, paramilitary 
movements and historical reconstruction groups).
Overall, two main ideological lines, supported 
by the vast majority of Russian nationalists, can 
be distinguished. The first line, often referred 
to as the imperial-Orthodox line, emerged in 
the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union, but 
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its ideological background reaches back to the 
19th and 20th century1. Supporters of this line of 
nationalism believe that the eastern Slavs cur-
rently living in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, as 
well as in the other post-Soviet states, are parts 
of one nation – at least in the cultural, if not the 
ethnic, sense. Representatives of this line of na-
tionalism consider it necessary to tighten the re-
lations between these countries, or even merge 
them into one state organism. Their aim is to re-
construct the lost empire. Therefore, they sup-
port those elements of Russian government pol-
icy which may help accomplish this goal, such as 
the creation of the Eurasian Union, which is the 
Kremlin’s priority integration project. However, 
the vision of the future form of the Russian state 
is an issue that divides this group: some of its 
supporters opt for reviving the USSR or a sub-
stitute for it, while others would rather see the 
comeback of a tsarist Russia.
The common elements among the supporters 
of the imperial-Orthodox line are their identifi-
cation with the Orthodox faith and the Russian 
Orthodox Church, and the promotion of its idea 
of the ‘Russian World’ (Russkiy Mir), under-
stood as a supranational community bonded by 
Russian culture, the Russian language and the 
Orthodox faith – a community reaching beyond 
the borders of contemporary Russia2. Organisa-
tions centred around this line also have a com-
mon enemy – the broadly understood West, 
in particular the USA, which in their opinion is 
striving to diminish Russia’s role in the interna-
tional arena and destroy Russia’s identity by im-
posing the Western model of democracy on it.
The imperial-Orthodox line of nationalism in-
cludes the Rodina (Fatherland) party, which is 
ostensibly an opposition party and whose infor-
mal leader is Dmitry Rogozin, as well as various 
other pro-Kremlin social organisations such as 
the Eurasian Youth Union (whose patron is Alek-
sandr Dugin, professor of Moscow State Univer-
1 For example, they refer to the idea of Panslavism, which 
became popular in the 19th century, or the concept of 
Eurasianism.
2 See the 2009 statement by Patriarch Kirill, http://www.
patriarchia.ru/db/text/928446.html
sity, and a supporter of the idea of Eurasianism) 
and the movement Sut’ Vremeni (Essence of 
Time) headed by Sergei Kurginyan; other com-
ponents include the Night Wolves motorcycle 
club and the Russian National Unity paramili-
tary movement headed by Aleksandr Barkashov, 
whose members used to include Pavel Gubaryev, 
one of the separatist leaders fighting in Ukraine. 
Other groups associated with this line of nation-
alism include organisations linked to the Ortho-
dox Church, such as Cossack movements. Repre-
sentatives of the imperial-Orthodox line include 
the former separatist leader Igor Girkin (Strelkov), 
a dedicated follower of the White Army tradition, 
and the Orthodox activist and oligarch Konstan-
tin Malofeyev. Other groups supporting this line 
of nationalism include certain online communi-
ties associated with websites such as Russkaya 
Vesna3 or Sputnik i Pogrom. (The latter was cre-
ated by Yegor Prosvirnin, and is considered one 
of the major centres of nationalist intellectual 
thought in Russia.) Some of these organisations 
favour strengthening relations with the Kremlin, 
which they expect to increase their influence on 
the decision-makers and help them gain finan-
cial support.
The other line of nationalism can be described 
as the national (ethnic) one. This emerged at 
the beginning of the 21st century as a response 
to the mass inflow of immigrants to Russia from 
Central Asia and Caucasus. Its supporters have 
anti-immigration and anti-Caucasus views. 
Their declared aim is to transform Russia into 
a nation state with ethnic Russians, who are al-
legedly discriminated against in their own state, 
3 A news portal presenting the Russian point of view on 
the events in Ukraine: rusvesna.su
Generally, two main ideological lines of 
nationalism, supported by the vast major-
ity of Russian nationalists, can be distin-
guished: the imperial-Orthodox and the 
ethnic (national) one.
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holding primacy over other citizens. One of this 
group’s main demands is to tighten control 
over the inflow of immigrants. Representatives 
of this line of nationalism have been involved 
in organising protests against the introduction 
of simplified rules of granting Russian citizen-
ship4, and have called for a visa regime to be 
introduced in relations with the states of Cen-
tral Asia and the Caucasus. Some of these activ-
ists would welcome Russia separating from the 
‘non-Russian’ Northern Caucasus.
The nationalists who could be identified with 
this line of nationalism usually take a hostile at-
titude towards the Kremlin, which results from 
their negative approach to the migration issue. 
They accuse the authorities of neglecting the 
interests of ethnic Russians and ignoring the 
problems in the social and security sphere con-
nected with the presence of immigrants. The 
fact that the Kremlin has strongly denied the 
possibility of introducing avisa regime in the 
tourist traffic with the CIS states, claiming that 
this would be contrary to the spirit of Eurasian 
integration5, positions these groups on the op-
position side. The most radical representatives 
of this line of nationalism consider Putin’s re-
gime to be anti-national.
The national line is represented by groups such 
as the Russians movement (Russkiye), the for-
mally dissolved Movement against Illegal Mi-
4 Katarzyna Jarzyńska, ‘Łatwiej o rosyjskie obywatelstwo’, 
Analizy OSW, 24 April 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/
publikacje/analizy/2014-04-24/latwiej-o-rosyjskie-oby-
watelstwo
5 See: http://www.fergananews.com/news/21311 
gration, the Russian National-Democratic Party, 
the Slavic Alliance, New Power or the Northern 
Brotherhood. The supporting groups also in-
clude Slavic neopagan movements, neo-Nazi 
groupings and organisations with pro-fascist 
orientations. Elements of anti-immigration 
rhetoric characteristic of the above-listed na-
tionalist organisations are also present in the 
platforms of liberal parties such as the Progress 
Party (led by Alexey Navalny) and the Demo-
cratic Choice (led by Vladimir Milov).
Nationalists as a tool in the Kremlin’s policy
In spite of the high level of nationalist senti-
ments among the population of Russia6 and the 
large number of nationalist-oriented organisa-
tions, representatives of nationalist groups do 
not have any official political representation. 
Although individual pro-Kremlin politicians 
such as Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogoz-
in and President Putin’s adviser Sergei Glazyev 
support nationalist views, they have no direct 
influence on political decisions.
The marginalisation of nationalist circles has re-
sulted mainly from the activities carried out by 
the Kremlin, which is both driving them away 
from the political stage and controlling their 
actions. The reasons for this behaviour include 
the immense distrust which the Kremlin has of 
all independent political or social initiatives. As 
a consequence, the nationalists are not allowed 
to freely participate in elections. It is the Krem-
lin that decides which parties will be allowed 
to run in the elections. The fact that the Rodina 
party, which had gained considerable popular 
support thanks to its anti-immigration slogans, 
was eliminated from the electoral race in 2006 
confirms this tendency7.
6 This is confirmed by the sharp reactions to ethnical-
ly-motivated incidents and the high level of acceptance 
for the slogan ‘Russia for the Russians’, supported by 
54% of the population: see http://www.levada.ru/26-
08-2014/natsionalizm-ksenofobiya-i-migratsiya
7 See: http://www.newizv.ru/politics/2006-03-24/43067 
-personalnoe-delo.html
The marginalisation of the nationalist cir-
cles has resulted mainly from the activi-
ties carried out by the Kremlin, which is 
driving them away from the political stage 
and controlling their actions, while simul-
taneously exploiting elements of national-
ist rhetoric for its own purposes.
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In recent years, organisations representing the 
ethnic line of nationalism have been subject to 
pressure and control from the authorities. To 
justify their actions, the government argues 
that due to the excessive popularisation of eth-
nic nationalist slogans, the multi-ethnic Russia 
would be in danger of breaking up. This was 
true in the case of the Chechen wars, which al-
most caused Russia to lose a part of its territo-
ry. For these reasons, the state has been limit-
ing the activities of the nationalist movements 
centred around this line of nationalism, e.g. by 
refusing to issue permissions to organise mass 
meetings. The leaders of some of these organ-
isations have been prosecuted (for example 
Aleksandr ‘Belov’ Potkin). As part of this tactic, 
the Kremlin attempted to infiltrate groups of 
football fans which support extreme nationalist 
and racist views. The special services gathered 
materials on the activity of the movements’ 
leaders and attempted to direct their actions. 
However, the series of street riots organised 
by football fans (such as the 2010 riots in the 
Manezh Square in Moscow) have demonstrated 
that their actions may evade the state’s control 
and challenge the effectiveness of the policy 
pursued by the authorities. 
On the other hand, the activity of radical nation-
alists in Russia (for example, young paratroopers) 
has been used by the Kremlin as a tool in its do-
mestic and foreign policy, serving as a negative 
example. By making references to certain inci-
dents provoked by the nationalists, such as the 
2013 riots in Biryulevo8, the authorities of Russia 
8 Katarzyna Jarzyńska, ‘Ethnic riots in Moscow’, OSW 
Analyses, 16 October 2013, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/analyses/2013-10-16/ethnic-riots-moscow 
are trying to convince its citizens that only the 
current ruling elite can guarantee law and order 
in the country. In its international relations the 
Kremlin is trying to demonstrate that although 
Putin’s regime has been criticised by the West for 
violating the principles of democracy, it is in fact 
a pragmatic and predictable partner – unlike the 
anti-Western radical nationalists. According to 
the Kremlin, their potential rise to power in Russia 
would be unfavourable for the Western partners, 
as it might lead to the emergence of social chaos 
and legal nihilism in Russia, and thereby increase 
the unpredictability in international relations.
Moreover, due to the large potential of support 
from Russian society for nationalist rhetoric, 
some elements of this rhetoric are being adopted 
and used by the Kremlin as tools for achieving 
its own goals. In previous years, the authorities 
successfully drew on slogans associated with eth-
nic nationalism during the pre-election period to 
increase the chances of the candidates they sup-
ported. One such case took place before the 2013 
elections for mayor of Moscow9. In the last two 
years, on the other hand, the authorities have 
started to draw ever more frequently on rhetoric 
typical of the imperial-Orthodox line of nation-
alism. A sharp turn was observed after Vladimir 
Putin’s return to the office of president in 2012, 
which happened in reaction to the weakening 
of the government’s social mandate and the in-
creased level of distrust within the elites. In their 
public statements, representatives of the Russian 
ruling elite began to emphasise the idea of Rus-
sia’s ‘unique identity’ and ‘civilisational mission’10, 
refer to the concept of the ‘Russian World’, and 
use sharp anti-Western rhetoric11. Vladimir Putin 
called for the Russian nation to be unified, which 
9 Katarzyna Jarzyńska, ‘The Kremlin plays the immigration 
card’, OSW Analyses, 20 August 2013, http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2013-08-23/
kremlin-plays-immigration-card 
10 Vladimir Putin, ‘Rossiya - nacyonalnyi vopros’, Nezavisi-
maya Gazeta, 23 January 2012, http://www.ng.ru/poli-
tics/2012-01-23/1_national.html
11 Marek Menkiszak, ‘The Putin doctrine: The formation of 
a conceptual framework for Russian dominance in the post-So-
viet area’, OSW Commentary, 27 March 2014, http://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-03-27/pu-
tin-doctrine-formation-a-conceptual-framework-russian
In the last two years the imperial-Orthodox 
line of nationalism, which previously had 
been present only on the margin of political 
discourse, has become one of the main ele-
ments of political debate in Russia.
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he described as ‘the largest divided nation in the 
world’12. Such statements refer to the demands 
expressed by representatives of the imperial-Or-
thodox line of nationalism. The inclusion of na-
tionalist slogans into the authorities’ rhetoric has 
led to an increase in appearances by individual 
intellectuals promoting imperialist views in the 
state-controlled media. The media has begun to 
devote more attention to the activity of certain 
state officials, such as Aleksey Pushkov, head of 
the foreign affairs committee at the State Duma, 
and Vyacheslav Nikonov, head of the state-spon-
sored Russkiy Mir foundation. Scientists and ex-
perts such as Aleksandr Dugin, Sergei Kurginyan, 
Mikhail Delagin and Natalya Narochnitskaya have 
started to appear in the public sphere ever more 
frequently. There has been an increase in the ac-
tivity of columnists and political commentators 
supporting nationalist or even extreme-national-
ist views, such as Aleksandr Prokhanov, Mikhail 
Leontyev and Dmitry Kiselov. The position of the 
main proponent of the concept of the ‘Russian 
World’, the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church 
Patriarch Kirill, has also been strengthened. There 
has been a simultaneous intensification of the 
activity of socially-oriented nationalist organi-
sations loyal towards the Kremlin, such as the 
Cossack and Orthodox movements. The Kremlin 
has expressed its support for some of the organ-
isations by granting them financial assistance 
(for example, the state subsidies for the Night 
Wolves club13, and organisations associated with 
the Orthodox Church14). As a consequence, the 
imperial-Orthodox line of nationalism, previously 
present only on the margin of political discourse, 
has become one of the main elements of political 
debate in Russia.
The Kremlin has used slogans borrowed from 
the nationalists as justification for the annex-
ation of Crimea, which was presented as an act 
of ‘serving historical justice’ and ‘uniting’ the 
12 http://kremlin.ru/news/20603
13 In 2014 the club received a presidential grant of 9 million 
roubles (c. US$180,000); for more see: http://rbcdaily.ru/
society/562949991750668
14 In 2014 the Orthodox Church received 2 billion roubles 
(c. US$40 million) in subsidies; for more, see http://top.
rbc.ru/politics/28/11/2014/54774e8acbb20ffbe61293aa
divided nation. The intervention in the Donbas 
was motivated by the necessity to defend the 
Russian minority. Additionally, the Kremlin has 
referred to the supra-ethnic, post-Soviet iden-
tity of the Russian-speaking people, and called 
for counteracting fascism and the hostile West. 
This type of narration has managed to combine 
elements of the two above-mentioned, essen-
tially contradictory lines of nationalist ideas: 
the ethnic and the imperial-Orthodox. The syn-
cretic narration based on nationalist slogans 
has helped the Kremlin to win – at least for 
a time – the support of representatives of the 
whole range of nationalist organisations, which 
differ greatly in terms of their ideological base.
From euphoria…
Although the opinions concerning the Maidan 
protests voiced by Russian nationalists were 
varied15, the actions carried out as part of 
the ‘Russian Spring’ have temporarily unit-
ed these circles around the Kremlin and as-
sured it of their support. The nationalists have 
come to think that in the context of the ‘Rus-
sian Spring’, their own interests and the inter-
ests of the Russian authorities are convergent.
15 Some of the activists opposed the protests in Kyiv, which 
lasted from November 2013 until February 2014, where-
as others supported them. The critics (mostly represen-
tatives of the imperial-Orthodox line of nationalism, in 
particular the pro-Kremlin organisations) claimed that 
the events in the Maidan were anti-Russian in nature 
and had been inspired by the West. On the other hand, 
a group of supporters of the protesters emerged (com-
posed mainly of representatives of the ethnic line of 
nationalism and members of the Russian radical right), 
who claimed that the Ukrainian nation had the right to 
protest against the corrupt authorities.
The actions carried out during the ‘Rus-
sian Spring’ consolidated the nationalist 
circles around the Kremlin. They became 
the Kremlin’s valuable ally, as their sup-
port was not limited to passive approval 
of its initiatives, but triggered real actions.
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The nationalists’ attitude at that time was in-
fluenced by several factors. The most import-
ant of them included the Kremlin’s own efforts, 
including an appeal for support expressed by 
Dmitry Rogozin during his meeting with rep-
resentatives of nationalist organisations who 
committed themselves to ‘defending the rights 
of Russians in Ukraine and in other parts of 
the world’16. The fact that the meeting was 
organised on 1 March, the day on which the 
Federation Council officially approved the use 
of Russian armed forces beyond Russia’s bor-
ders, suggests that the involvement of the na-
tionalists into the events in Ukraine had been 
pre-planned. The pro-Kremlin attitude of the 
nationalists at that time was also shaped by 
the aggressive propaganda present in the me-
dia, which suggested that the Russian-speaking 
population in Ukraine was being subjected to 
persecution. Due to this, the actions carried 
out by the new authorities in Kyiv (constitut-
ed as a result of the Maidan protests) have 
been considered by this circle as anti-Russian. 
The increase in support for the Kremlin’s policy 
was also inspired by the near-bloodless annex-
ation of Crimea, which caused euphoric moods 
among the nationalists and boosted hopes for 
further successes in the fight focused on ‘de-
fending the Russians’17.
During the ‘Russian Spring’ the Kremlin consid-
ered the nationalist circles its valuable allies. Their 
support was not limited to passive approval of 
the Kremlin’s initiatives; instead it triggered ac-
16 See: http://www.interfax-russia.ru/South/special.asp?id 
=477480&sec=1724&p=2
17 The liberal parties headed by Navalny and Milov were an 
exception.
tions consistent with the authorities’ expectations. 
Some activists, including in particular Igor Girkin 
and Konstantin Malofeev, became directly involved 
in fuelling separatist sentiments in Ukraine18. Na-
tionalist-oriented commentators and ideologists 
(such as Yegor Kholmogorov and Aleksandr Dugin) 
joined the public debate on the conflict in Ukraine 
and attempted to convince the citizens that Rus-
sian intervention was necessary. Assistance for 
rebel fighters was prepared in Russia. Some of the 
activists took part in pro-Russian rallies and actions 
involving taking the regional administration build-
ings in eastern Ukraine by force. The most radical 
activists volunteered to join the fighting in Donbas; 
news on these developments was posted by some 
of the organisations on their websites, such as the 
Eurasian Youth Union and Russian National Unity. 
The scale of mobilisation of the nationalists has 
been confirmed by data compiled by the Ukrainian 
customs service in Donetsk, according to which 
in March 2014 the number of Russian men being 
denied entry onto the territory of Ukraine ran at 
around 400–500 each day. The reason for deny-
ing them entry to Ukraine was that they were un-
able to declare a credible purpose for their travel, 
or were carrying objects (such as posters, leaflets, 
or St. George’s ribbons) associated with separat-
ist activities. The Russian writer and nationalist 
Zakhar Prilepin claims that during the six months 
of fighting in Donbas, some 35,000 volunteers 
from Russia joined the rebel fighter groups19. The 
voluntary involvement of nationalists in the fight 
has enabled the Kremlin to refute the international 
community’s charges concerning the alleged pres-
ence of regular Russian troops in Ukraine. However, 
the collective and organised nature of the transfers 
of the voluntary recruits to Ukraine suggests that 
these activities could have been coordinated and 
financed by Russia’s secret service20.
18 Malofeev’s interview for Vedomosti, http://www.vedo-
mosti.ru/newspaper/article/790641/v-sankcionnye-spis-
ki-vklyuchali-posovokupnosti-zaslug and Girkin’s inter-
view for the Svobodnaya Pressa portal, http://svpressa.
ru/war21/article/103643/
19 This news was posted on the author’s Facebook page on 
4 November.
20 This was reported e.g. by Novaya Gazeta, http://www.
novayagazeta.ru/inquests/64052.html
The nationalist circles’ enthusiasm fol-
lowing the annexation of Crimea and the 
initial successes of the ‘Russian Spring’ 
has gradually given way to disappoint-
ment with the Kremlin’s ‘insufficient’ in-
volvement in the conflict in Ukraine.
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…to disappointment
The attitude of the Russian nationalists towards 
the Kremlin’s policy has evolved as the conflict 
in Ukraine progressed. The enthusiasm that fol-
lowed the annexation of Crimea and the initial 
successes of the ‘Russian Spring’ has gradually 
given way to disappointment with the ‘insuffi-
cient’ involvement of the Kremlin. Some of the 
most radical nationalists criticised the fact that 
after the ‘referenda’ in the so-called Donetsk 
and Lugansk People’s Republics, Moscow failed 
to incorporate these lands into the Russian 
Federation (i.e. it refused to repeat the Crimea 
scenario). Similar criticism has been voiced in 
connection with the signing of the Minsk peace 
deals21. Contrary to the demands made by the 
nationalists, the Kremlin has not officially dis-
patch Russian troops to Ukraine. This group’s 
frustration has been further strengthened by 
the fact that the Russian volunteers and sol-
diers killed in Donbas have been receiving se-
cret burials in Russia. The dissatisfaction has 
been further deepened by reports claiming 
that the Russian secret services have alleged-
ly stopped allowing the voluntary recruits to 
move from Russia to Ukraine22. Individuals in-
volved in organising assistance are subject to 
detailed inspections (this has been confirmed 
by one of the editors of the Sputnik i Pogrom 
website, among others)23. The media presence 
21 The truce deal signed on 5 September by members of 
the so-called trilateral contact group (Ukraine, Russia, 
OSCE) and the representatives of the separatists.
22 See ‘V Novorossiyu ne puskayut dobrovoltsev’, http://
www.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/10/06_a_6252029.shtml
23 The portal’s editor’s opinion of 2 October, http://sput-
nikipogrom.com/russia/21993/now-its-getting-interest-
ing/#.VEZinBZFOKY
of ideologists supporting ‘Novorossiya’ has 
been gradually reduced24. Another reason for 
the dissatisfaction on the part of Novorossiya’s 
supporters is the fact that Igor Strelkov has left 
Ukraine, which, in his own words, was Mos-
cow’s decision25. These signals have reinforced 
the radical nationalists’ belief that one group 
of Russian decision-makers is attempting to 
distance the Kremlin from the separatists and 
extinguish support for Novorossiya. This group 
is led by a person the radical nationalists hate 
– Vladislav Surkov, the Russian President’s ad-
viser, who is considered one of the architects of 
Russia’s policy towards Ukraine.
Consequences of the flirtation 
with nationalism
The ‘Russian Spring’ has resulted in creating 
two separatist republics in eastern Ukraine, 
which has enabled Kremlin to temporarily de-
stabilise the Ukrainian state. This solution does 
not satisfy some of representatives of radical 
nationalist circles, who would like Novorossiya 
to be recognised as an independent state, its 
territory further expanded, and Russian troops 
to be dispatched there officially26.
The expectations of some of the nationalist 
circles regarding the conflict in Ukraine have 
become a problem for the authorities. This 
has resulted in the Kremlin’s attempts at sub-
ordinating these circles to it. This policy has 
boosted the feelings of disappointment and 
frustration within these circles, and may lead 
to the emergence of a movement opposing the 
authorities in Russia, whose members would 
24 The term Novorossiya is used to describe the informal 
confederation of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Re-
publics. However, it originally referred to the historical 
name of the areas incorporated into the Russian Empire 
in the 18th century as a result of the wars with Turkey, 
and which currently belong to Ukraine. This is what Pu-
tin meant when he said that the historical ‘Novorossiya’ 
comprised the entire area of south-eastern Ukraine. See 
Putin’s statement of 17 April 2014, http://kremlin.ru/
news/20796
25 Interview given by Strelkov, http://govoritmoskva.ru/in-
terviews/265/
26 Ibid.
The Kremlin has already attempted to re-
spond to the threat and channel the nation-
alists’ growing disappointment in a form 
which would be safe for the authorities.
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be ideologically motivated and equipped with 
organisational structures. Their involvement in 
the war has enabled them to gain experience in 
real combat, which in turn has radicalised their 
attitudes yet further.
The threat to the ruling elite posed by the radi-
cal nationalists has been aggravated by the ac-
tions carried out by the authorities, which have 
selectively drawn on nationalist rhetoric for 
the purpose of social consolidation. In recent 
months the Kremlin has been deliberately fuel-
ling anti-Western and anti-immigrant moods in 
society, referring to slogans typical of imperial 
nationalism (i.e. demanding restoration of the 
empire and opposing the West) and ethnic na-
tionalism (the defence of the ‘oppressed’ Rus-
sian). Due to the popularisation of radical na-
tionalist attitudes among average Russians and 
the increase in the scale of acceptance for the 
use of violence among Russian public, Russian 
society will be more likely to accept the poten-
tial presence of supporters of radical nationalist 
views in the country’s ruling elite.
The threats associated with the increased activity 
of the nationalists, together with the popularisa-
tion of nationalist slogans in Russia, have been 
heightened due to the prospect of economic de-
stabilisation. This has already been heralded by 
the unfavourable macroeconomic situation and 
the preliminary results of the international eco-
nomic sanctions27. In the long-term perspective 
this may lead to an increase in the scale of disap-
pointment among the business elite and a part 
of society, as well as a certain weakening of the 
model of government in Russia. If this is the case, 
the nationalists, who are strongly motivated and 
centred around a clear ideological programme, 
will have a better chance of strengthening their 
position within the state and soliciting for their 
inclusion in a ruling elite which today seems her-
metic.
It appears that the Kremlin has already attempt-
ed to respond to the threat and channel the 
nationalists’ growing disappointment in a form 
which would be safe for the authorities. One ex-
ample of this seems to be the increased public 
activity of Igor Strelkov (who is unquestionably 
a respected figure in the radical nationalist 
circles), which would not have been possi-
ble without the Kremlin’s approval. It cannot 
be excluded that he will become the leader of 
a nationalist-oriented political force which 
would cooperate with the authorities. In the 
context of the fossilisation of the Russian polit-
ical system, the inclusion of such individuals in 
the country’s ruling elite might have unforesee-
able consequences.
27 See: the World Bank report, http://www.worldbank.org/
en/news/press-release/2014/09/24/russia-economic-re-
port-32 
